Why a CVSS threshold alone is not enough to filter vulnerability alerts reliably
A developer running a vulnerability write-up site built an automated triage script that pulls CVEs daily from two sources: NIST's NVD, filtered to CVSS scores of 7.0 and above, and CISA's KEV catalog, included in full regardless of score. The two sources were kept separate by design, as KEV confirms active exploitation while CVSS only predicts potential severity — merging them caused lower-scored but actively exploited bugs to be overlooked. A critical flaw emerged when failed data fetches and genuinely quiet days both returned zero results, making a broken pipeline indistinguishable from a clean one. The fix involved collecting errors explicitly and setting a non-zero exit code whenever a fetch failed, so callers could tell a truly empty result from a silent failure. The lesson is that a filtering threshold is incomplete until the system can distinguish between 'nothing found' and 'nothing was even checked.'
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