What True 'Local OCR' Means: Keeping Every User Byte Off the Network
A developer has outlined what genuine browser-based OCR privacy should require, arguing that 'runs in your browser' is meaningless unless every user-derived byte — including source files, filenames, PDF passwords, and extracted text — is prevented from crossing any network or process boundary. The article highlights subtle privacy leaks common in so-called local OCR tools, such as sending extracted text to error-reporting services or exposing PDF passwords via URLs. To handle the CPU and memory demands of on-device OCR without freezing the browser, the author recommends offloading processing to a dedicated Web Worker using transferable objects like ImageBitmap to avoid costly memory duplication. The pipeline is split into two model stages — a text detector and a recognition model — with strict input validation checks on image dimensions, pixel count, and file type before any inference begins. The author also stresses that network policy should be automatically testable, with tests designed to fail if any uniquely marked user data appears in outgoing requests.
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