Verifying SCITT receipts requires agreed rules beyond the receipt itself
A technical write-up highlights a verification gap in SCITT Receipts for the RFC9162_SHA256 data structure, which the VeritasChain Protocol profile draft does not resolve. The receipt contains a Merkle root signature and an inclusion proof, but does not specify what the leaf represents, which signing key a verifier should trust, or whether tree size and leaf index are authenticated. The author notes that a hackathon report presented at IETF 127 reached similar conclusions, with teams needing out-of-band agreements on leaf definition, signing keys, and tree size. The article also states that the draft's open issues remain unadopted and that the cited Internet-Drafts are individual submissions without IETF endorsement. The author discloses that there are no external implementations or accepted evidence packs for the framework.
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