Switching to Async HTTP Cuts AWS Bedrock Embedding Time from 50s to 1.5s

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A developer optimizing a RAG ingestion pipeline discovered that processing 33 text chunks via AWS Bedrock was taking nearly 50 seconds, despite minimal CPU usage. The bottleneck was sequential HTTP requests, where each embedding call had to complete before the next one began, leaving the system idle during network wait times. Replacing the blocking requests library with aiohttp and asyncio.gather allowed all 33 calls to be dispatched concurrently, reducing total processing time to 1.56 seconds — a 31.8x speedup. The change required no infrastructure modifications, only an update to a single Python file handling embedding logic. The developer notes that the performance gap widens significantly at scale, with 1,000-chunk jobs potentially shrinking from 26 minutes to under 10 seconds.

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