Swift Tool Blocks BadUSB Keystroke Attacks on macOS Before They Execute
A developer building a macOS security utility called RoamSwitch demonstrated how a malicious OMG Cable — indistinguishable from a standard USB-C charging cord — can compromise a Mac in under 500 milliseconds by injecting keystrokes at over 1,000 words per minute. The attack exploits macOS trust architecture, which treats any authorized USB keyboard as legitimate human input, bypassing Ventura's accessory-connection dialog once a user clicks 'Allow.' To counter this, the developer implemented a fail-closed keystroke quarantine in Swift using IOHIDManager to detect unrecognized USB keyboards and a system-wide CGEventTap to instantly drop all keystrokes before they reach the OS. A modal prompt then asks the user to approve or reject the new device, ensuring no payload can execute during the confirmation window. The solution deliberately avoids Apple's DriverKit framework to sidestep lengthy entitlement approvals and complex installation requirements for indie developers.
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