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Study finds 22.4% of AI Overview traffic lands in GA4 Direct, not Organic

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A nine-month first-party analysis of one transportation-industry brand found that nearly a quarter of tracked Google AI Overview traffic was classified as Direct in Google Analytics 4 rather than Organic. The study covered September 2025 through June 2026 and recorded 51,200 referral events across 1,661 cited snippets. AI Overviews made up 7.53% of organic sessions overall, though their share swung from peaks of about 16% to 17% down to roughly 2% to 4% in recent months. Researchers suggest Google's text-fragment URL parameter may cause these visits to be misclassified, though the same pattern can appear in other Google features. The authors caution that the results reflect a single brand and should not be treated as a universal benchmark.

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