Security researchers flag two risks in NVIDIA NeMo .nemo model files that scanners may miss
NVIDIA NeMo stores models as .nemo files, which are tar archives holding a config and a torch checkpoint that is a pickle, so the checkpoint can carry code-execution payloads. Many pickle scanners do not unpack the outer tar, leaving that payload undetected. A separate flaw in NeMo releases before r2.0.0rc0 failed to sanitise tar member names, allowing a crafted file to write outside the extraction folder (CWE-22, NVD score 7.8). The author released nemo_container_scan.py, an open-source Apache-2.0 tool that inspects .nemo contents in memory without extracting or unpickling anything. It exits with an error code on high-severity findings so it can gate CI pipelines, though it performs static review only and does not prove exploitability.
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