Pydio Cells security review: tokens, workspace access and public shares need separate inventories
Security assessments of Pydio Cells that only examine the login page can miss exposure through personal access tokens and public shares. Pydio documents personal access tokens as a substitute for the standard OAuth flow, and these can be scoped to a specific node, though they do not grant access independently of the user's workspace permissions. The article recommends reviewing each delegation path separately, including OAuth clients, tokens, workspace ACLs and public links, and revoking tokens that lack an owner or documented use. Public links should be inventoried for their creator, target, permission level and expiration, and tested after the creator's access is removed. ZoomEye counts from November 2026 are cited only as leads, since they do not confirm misconfiguration on any host.
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