pqc-probe-web: How a public scanner blocks SSRF and abuse

The pqc-probe CLI runs locally against servers chosen by the user, but its web version lets strangers submit hostnames that the operator's server then probes over TLS and SSH. This design creates a request-forgery risk, so the service must keep submissions away from the internal network, prevent use as a free port scanner, withstand load, and avoid rendering hostile server output unsafely. The service documents a threat model covering internal networks, third-party servers, the operator's IP reputation, its own capacity, and visitors. Requests pass a fixed sequence of checks before any socket opens, starting with a strict hostname syntax filter. After DNS resolution, every IPv4 address in the answer is checked against a blocklist of private, loopback, link-local and other reserved ranges, and the whole target is refused if any one address is blocked. The probe then connects to the pre-checked address, which prevents rebinding.
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