osFoundry enforces Claude Code tool allowlists on its MCP server, not through CLI flags
osFoundry's desktop app passes an MCP configuration to Claude Code when it runs as a worker agent, binding the bridge to localhost on an OS-assigned port with a per-run token. The author explains that the agent runs with bypassPermissions, which makes Claude Code ignore the --allowedTools flag, so the flag offers no real protection. Instead, the server filters the tool list and checks every tools/call against the run's allowed tools, since the model could still attempt calls to unlisted tools via hallucination or prompt injection. The piece also notes that notifications must return a 202 with an empty body to avoid breaking some MCP clients such as Codex. A rebuilt Python version of the bridge is described as a way for readers to test the behavior themselves.
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