Oracle PL/SQL Exception Handling: Types, Rules, and Code Examples Explained

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Oracle PL/SQL exceptions are runtime error conditions that interrupt normal block execution and transfer control to a designated EXCEPTION section for handling. PL/SQL classifies exceptions into three types: predefined Oracle server errors (such as NO_DATA_FOUND and ZERO_DIVIDE), non-predefined server errors that require manual declaration and binding via PRAGMA EXCEPTION_INIT, and user-defined exceptions raised explicitly by developers for custom business logic. Only one exception handler executes per block run, and the WHEN OTHERS clause, if used, must always appear last in the EXCEPTION section. Non-predefined exceptions are linked to specific ORA- error codes at compile time using the PRAGMA compiler directive in the DECLARE section. Understanding these categories and their declaration requirements helps developers write more robust and maintainable PL/SQL code.

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ProgrammingDEV Community ·

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ProgrammingDEV Community ·

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ProgrammingDEV Community ·

Developer fixes AI agent that executed questions and negations as commands

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