LiteLLM disaster recovery requires database, config, and decryption key together

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LiteLLM, an AI gateway proxy, is not stateless in team deployments — its PostgreSQL database stores virtual keys, user and team records, budgets, rate limits, and spend history. A full recovery requires three components restored together: the PostgreSQL database, the gateway configuration file, and the decryption key used to protect stored credentials. Restoring only the container or only the database is insufficient to return the system to a working state. The decryption key should be stored separately from the database backup to avoid keeping encrypted data and its key in the same location. Operators are advised to rehearse restores on throwaway instances and treat a never-tested backup as unverified.

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