Injection text never altered host state in 10 million-proposal test of LLM agent gate
A CPU-only test of the host-side layer for an LLM agent architecture fed 10 million hostile and random proposals into the front door, 1,401,041 of them containing prompt-injection text. None of the injection proposals were committed, and the host's graph matched an independent reference at every comparison. The model never writes state directly; it only proposes one change, which the host accepts or refuses through a strict parse, a rule check, and an all-or-nothing commit. The test covered 14 attack families, including numeric extremes, control characters, look-alike digits, and replays, and it also surfaced four areas the author plans to harden. The article is about the design's resilience to hostile text, not about the model being fooled.
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