How to show auditors that no employee can access customer keys on Lit Protocol
The recommended audit answer is a design where no employee has a technical path to the keys, backed by evidence auditors can verify independently. On Lit Protocol, keys are derived inside an attested Intel TDX enclave and are never stored or exported by Lit's code, while usage rules sit in a Base contract. Switching an account to ChainSecured mode lets a Safe multisig you control be the only account allowed to change those rules. Auditors can then check the enclave attestation via Phala's Trust Center, read the rules, and review every change as a signed transaction. The guidance also notes limits to disclose, such as Lit's multisig retaining the ability to upgrade the contract and approve enclave code.
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