Four ways Amazon Cognito breaks MCP server auth flows and how to fix them
A developer building an OAuth flow for an MCP server discovered four undocumented integration failures between Amazon Cognito and the MCP authorization spec. The first issue arises because Cognito rejects RFC 8707 Resource Indicator parameters that spec-compliant MCP clients like Claude's connector send unconditionally, requiring a thin OAuth proxy to strip the unsupported parameter before requests reach Cognito. A second problem involves audience validation: unlike ID tokens, Cognito access tokens carry no 'aud' claim, so MCP servers must check the 'client_id' field combined with a 'token_use: access' assertion to satisfy the spec's audience requirement. All four issues stem from the friction between two specifications written independently, with none of the failure modes documented in Cognito's standard guides. The findings emerged from a single week of integration work and are shared to help other developers avoid the same hidden pitfalls.
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