EKS Auth Bug Let Attackers Inject Fake Kubernetes Identities via Parameter Pollution
A vulnerability in Amazon EKS's aws-iam-authenticator allowed attackers to manipulate Kubernetes usernames by exploiting an HTTP parameter pollution flaw in how access key IDs were parsed. The authenticator extracted the AccessKeyID from client-supplied URL query parameters rather than from the verified AWS STS response, meaning an attacker could supply a duplicate, case-variant credential parameter to make the two parsers disagree on which value to use. As a result, AWS would authenticate the request under a victim's identity while the cluster assigned a Kubernetes username derived from the attacker's key, effectively decoupling AWS-side authentication from cluster-side identity. The flaw, disclosed as Kubernetes HackerOne report 1580493, was remediated by replacing the {{AccessKeyID}} template substitution with {{SessionName}}, a value sourced entirely from the STS response that the client cannot influence. Administrators can further harden configurations by switching to ARN-based identity mappings, which rely solely on server-derived, signed values and eliminate client-controlled input from the identity layer.
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