EAP-TLS Needs Identity Mapping Beyond a Trusted CA for Network Access
EAP-TLS authenticates both the client and the RADIUS server with certificates, but a trusted CA alone is not enough to authorize access. Organizations must map each certificate to an authoritative device or user record before assigning a VLAN or role, since a valid certificate tied to a retired device or shared account can otherwise act as a portable network key. The article recommends tying certificate lifecycles to identity lifecycles, separating machine and user certificate policies, and restricting onboarding networks with short-lived credentials. It also advises testing failure cases such as expired, revoked, or mismatched certificates, and confirming that a RADIUS outage does not silently open ports.
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