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diffctx CLI packages Git changes into LLM-ready markdown with secret redaction

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A developer has released diffctx, an open-source command-line tool that converts Git changesets into structured, token-aware markdown for use with large language models or coding agents. The tool captures commit subjects, file lists, unified diffs, changed file contents, and related tests in a single packaged document. Unlike whole-repository packers, diffctx is designed specifically for reviewing discrete changes such as pull requests or recent breakages. It runs entirely locally with no API keys or network access, and applies best-effort redaction of common secrets like PATs, cloud keys, and JWTs before output. The project is available via Go install at version 0.1.0, with planned improvements including better related-file discovery and integration with GitHub's CLI for PR fetching.

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diffctx CLI packages Git changes into LLM-ready markdown with secret redaction · ShortSingh