Developer Uses AI Agents to Build a CMS, Finds Human Code Review Still Critical

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A developer built a content management system using AI coding agents connected to a kanban board (Kanboard) and a git server (Gitea), orchestrated by a tool called Marcus, without writing any code himself. The setup allowed multiple agents to work on separate tickets simultaneously, each on its own branch with a live preview environment. A key design choice required every completed ticket to pass through a human review checkpoint before merging into the main codebase. During these reviews, the developer caught several serious issues the agents introduced silently, including a weak session store, a broken permission check, and an XSS vulnerability in comment rendering. The experiment highlights a shift in the developer's role from writing code to auditing it, arguing that visibility into AI-made decisions during the build process is essential to producing secure and reliable software.

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ProgrammingDEV Community ·

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ProgrammingDEV Community ·

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