Developer's AI answer-checker missed all injection attacks until one overlooked fix caught them
A developer building an AI-powered checker for retirement advice discovered a critical blind spot: the system had no way to detect prompt-injection attacks carried inside AI-drafted answers. Initial red-team testing showed the checker's judge models successfully blocked all 12 planted factual errors, but 3 of 4 correct answers containing injected instructions were sent to customers without review. The core problem was that the system never treated the incoming draft as untrusted data, meaning malicious text embedded in it could potentially manipulate the checker's output. Three fixes were applied: judge prompts were updated to treat drafts as untrusted, a fail-closed rule was added for missing or malformed outputs, and a regex layer was introduced to flag known injection markers. A second independent red-team round confirmed the updated system blocked all 20 new attacks without falsely flagging legitimate answers.
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