Developer builds runtime MCP security scanner after static tools missed his own access-control bug
A developer discovered a critical access-control flaw in Warden, his own role-based governance layer for MCP servers, where support-role users could infer hidden billing data by using restricted fields as query filters. Standard MCP security scanners failed to detect the vulnerability because they only analyze static tool manifests, not live server behavior. To address this gap, he built Siege, a runtime scanner that connects to a live MCP server as different user identities and compares what each role can access. Siege uses a differential approach, learning the full schema from the most-permissive identity and probing restricted roles for discrepancies, without relying on hardcoded field names or roles. The tool independently surfaced four classes of authorization vulnerabilities, including filter leaks, row-scope escalation, ID enumeration, and forbidden-resource reads.
This is an AI-generated summary. ShortSingh links to the original source for the complete article.
Discussion (0)
Log in to join the discussion and vote.
Log in