Clickjacking Risk Depends on Framing, Login State and One-Click Actions, Not Just a Missing Header

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A DEV Community post argues that a missing X-Frame-Options header alone is often not a serious vulnerability, since many bug bounty programs close such reports as informative. Real clickjacking risk requires three conditions: the page can be framed by another site, it loads while the user is logged in, and it contains an action that can be completed with a click or two. The author explains that the attack tricks users into clicking genuine buttons, which is why CSRF tokens offer no protection. The piece also covers how to inspect framing headers per response and how frame-ancestors overrides X-Frame-Options, and it includes a triage script for testing authorized applications.

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